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Abstract 
This paper contributes to the debate on the effects of the financialization of commodity futures 
markets by studying the conditional volatility of long-short commodity portfolios and their 
conditional correlations with traditional assets (stocks and bonds). Using several groups of 
trading strategies that hedge fund managers are known to implement, we show that long-short 
speculators do not cause changes in the volatilities of the portfolios they hold or changes in the 
conditional correlations between these portfolios and traditional assets. Thus calls for increased 
regulation of commodity money managers are, at this stage, premature. Additionally, long-short 
speculators can take comfort in knowing that their trades do not alter the risk and diversification 
properties of their portfolios. 
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1. Introduction 
The surge in commodity investing and its potential impact on prices (or the so-called 
“financialization” of commodity markets) has been the subject of an intense debate, both in the 
political and regulatory arenas and in academic circles. Commodity futures became increasingly 
desired by investors due to their equity-like returns, inflation hedging and diversification benefits 
(Gorton and Rouwenhorst, 2006; Erb and Harvey, 2006), resulting in substantial increases in 
trading volumes and open interest (Irwin and Sanders, 2012). It has been reported that volatility 
was greater in the late 2000’s than in the past and this may increase hedging margin call costs and 
diminish the willingness of commodity purchasers to engage in forward purchases, thereby 
reducing farmers’ chances of ensuring price certainty (Hailu and Weersink, 2010).  
But did commodity investors damage the price-setting mechanism, driving commodity prices 
away from their fundamentals? This view has been repeatedly expressed by politicians and in the 
media. The 2009 Staff Report by the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation 
argues in favor of this proposition, stating that a rise in the long positions of commodity index 
traders (CITs) caused a commodity price bubble.
1
 In April 2012, Finance Watch further argues 
that excessive speculation and its positive impact on prices led to food riots and social unrest, 
preventing the risk transfer that usually takes place in commodity futures markets between 
hedgers and speculators.
2
 In an attempt to curb speculation and volatility from occurring in the 
future, Finance Watch calls for greater transparency in hedgers’ and speculators’ positions, the 
definition of stringent position limits for speculators and a ban on commodity index instruments. 
This article adds to the debate on the financialization of commodity futures markets by using a 
novel approach to testing whether long-short commodity investors have an impact on the 
volatility of the portfolios they hold and on the correlation between their long-short commodity 
portfolios and traditional assets (S&P500 composite index and Barclays Capital US Aggregate 
bond index). The large majority of research to examine the impact of speculators on commodity 
markets focuses on percentage price changes, rather than volatility or cross-market correlations. 
                                                          
1The report entitled “Excessive Speculation in the Wheat Market” is available at 
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/reports 
2
 Finance Watch, 2012, Investing not betting, Making financial markets serve society, A position 
paper on MiFID 2/MiFIR, April. 
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In addition, while the literature for the most part centers on the trade impact of net-long CITs, we 
study the role of long-short traders (such as commodity trading advisors (CTAs) or more 
generally hedge funds), a topic that is solely addressed in Büyükşahin and Robe (2010) and 
Brunetti et al. (2011). The novelty of our approach relative to these two articles comes from the 
fact that we use a battery of strategies that hedge funds are known to follow (such as momentum 
and term structure investing) and then test the proposition that the trading of these long-short 
speculators Granger-causes (see Granger, 1969) a change in the volatility of their portfolios or a 
change in cross-market correlations. To our knowledge we are the first to examine such strategies 
in the context of their impact on commodity market price variability and correlations. Another 
advantage of our approach is that, relative to previous studies, it enables us to employ a much 
larger cross section over a longer time span. We are also able to test the hypothesis that long-
short investors may be destroying through their actions the very risk diversification they sought 
out in the first instance. A finding that long-short commodity traders increase volatility and cross-
market linkages could also legitimate popular claims for increased regulation.  
Our results indicate that speculators have no significant impact on volatility or cross-market 
correlation. This conclusion holds irrespective of whether speculators are labeled as “non-
commercial” in the CFTC (Commodity Futures Trading Commission) Commitment of Traders 
(COT) report or “professional money managers” (i.e., CTAs, commodity pool operators (CPOs) 
and hedge funds) in the CFTC disaggregated COT report. It follows that calls for increased 
regulation of commodity money managers are, at this stage, premature: they are unlikely to 
prevent volatility from rising again in the future. Our results also indicate that long-short 
managers can take comfort in the knowledge that their trades do not distort volatility and 
correlation and thus do not alter the risk and diversification properties of their portfolios. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets up the debate on the 
financialization of commodity futures markets from an academic perspective. Section 3 presents 
the dataset we use. Section 4 introduces the methodologies employed to capture the returns 
earned by long-short speculators in commodity futures markets, the conditional volatility of their 
portfolios and the conditional correlation between their returns and traditional assets. Section 4 
also highlights the methodology used to test whether changes in the positions of speculators 
Granger-cause changes in conditional volatility or in conditional correlations. Section 5 discusses 
our results and finally section 6 concludes. 
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2. Where does the debate stand in academic circles?  
The academic debate as to whether the financialization of commodity markets is responsible for 
the observed volatility of commodity prices has been intense and is still on-going. The discussion 
centers around the potentially destabilizing role of net-long CITs and long-short speculators 
(such as CTAs) on commodity futures prices.  
The evidence from the perspective of CITs is mixed. On one side, using various approaches 
including Granger-causality tests, Irwin et al. (2009) and Stoll and Whaley (2010) show that CITs 
had no role in the price rises observed in 2006-2008. Sanders and Irwin (2010a) further argue that 
in four grain futures markets, the rise in the participation of index traders took place two to three 
years before the price bubble observed in 2007-2008, a result that clears CITs of any 
accountability for the bubble. Likewise, Sanders and Irwin (2011b) conclude that swap dealers, 
who are considered as CITs, far from destabilizing markets, Granger-cause decreases in market 
volatility. Gilbert and Morgan (2010) further argue that there is evidence that the prices of 
foodstuffs actually became more stable during the 1990s and 2000s at the same time as the 
activities of CITs increased. According to this literature, rather than CITs, it is fundamentals and 
supply and demand imbalances that are to blame for the price bubble.
3
  
On the other hand, there are several noteworthy studies arguing that CITs did cause the 2007-
2008 price spike by increasing correlations across indexed commodity futures. Gilbert (2010), in 
particular, argues that index activity was driven in part by a belief that economic growth in China 
would increase demand for numerous commodities, and in part by a desire to hedge falls in the 
US dollar. Likewise, Tang and Xiong (2012) see index traders as more influential on price 
determination than other factors such as a weakening in the US dollar, an increase in the demand 
for indexed commodities, the financial crisis that followed Lehman Brothers' demise, a sudden 
rise in inflation or the widespread use of biofuel. As a result of the financialization of commodity 
markets via commodity index funds, the prices of indexed commodities rose in tandem, causing 
                                                          
3
 For example, Hamilton (2009) blames the stagnation in global supply and the rapid growth in 
global demand for the oil price shock of 2007-2008. Korniotis (2009) relates the sharp rise in 
spot metal prices in 2003-2004 to economic fundamentals such as rising demand and 
consumption or falling production and inventories. Calvo-Gonzales et al. (2010), examining a 
very long panel of commodity prices back to the end of the eighteenth century, argue that price 
volatility has risen and fallen enormously over the past century or so along with changes in 
fundamentals.  
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an increase in their correlations. Relatedly, Cheng et al. (2012) argue that in times of distress, 
CITs, by reducing their net long exposures, fail to provide the insurance that short hedgers 
demand. 
Another strand of research – which is perhaps more related to our article – focuses on whether 
long-short investors are to blame for the observed price changes. Here too, the conclusions thus 
far are rather inconclusive. Tests for excessive speculation support the idea that speculation rose 
merely as a response to a rise in hedging demand (Till, 2009; Sanders et al., 2010) and thus that 
long-short speculators are not to blame for excessive price impact. Likewise, Brunetti et al. 
(2011) test whether changes in the net positions of hedge funds in three commodities (corn, crude 
oil and natural gas) Granger-cause volatility. They conclude that such funds, far from 
destabilizing markets, actually decrease volatility. Thus these articles refute the idea that long-
short traders have harmful impact. Rather, they act as liquidity and insurance providers, being 
beneficial to markets overall. This conclusion ought to be viewed with caution, however, in the 
light of Büyükşahin and Robe (2010), who find hedge funds active in both equity and commodity 
futures markets responsible for the rise in conditional correlations between commodity and stock 
indices observed since 2008.  
Therefore, the empirical evidence on whether long-short speculators have a destabilizing role is 
mixed. It is also not obvious from a theoretical perspective whether speculators move prices away 
from equilibrium. The traditional view, as put forward by Friedman (1953), is that speculators (or 
rational news traders) stabilize prices: by buying low and selling high, they bring prices closer to 
fundamentals. Yet, De Long et al. (1990) bring forward a theoretical model showing that rational 
news traders, by anticipating the price impact of trend followers (or positive feedback traders), 
actually end up destabilizing markets. In their model, rational speculators, in anticipation of the 
forthcoming buy/sell orders of trend followers, increase their long/short positions today in the 
hope of earning higher returns tomorrow. As a result, far from stabilizing prices, they end up 
setting price trends and deterring short-term prices away from fundamentals. It is thus not 
obvious from a theoretical standpoint whether long-short speculators stabilize markets.  
Like Büyükşahin and Robe (2010) and Brunetti et al. (2011), this paper tests whether long-short 
speculators destabilize commodity futures markets by increasing volatility or cross-market 
correlations. Unlike the aforementioned articles, however, we use a novel approach that consists 
of first, modeling the returns that long-short speculators earn using a battery of strategies that 
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they are known to follow and then, explicitly testing whether their trading has any impact on the 
volatility of the portfolios they hold or on cross-market correlations. This approach enables us to 
test the robustness of the conclusions of Büyükşahin and Robe (2010) and Brunetti et al. (2011) 
to the use of a different methodology,
4
 while considering a much larger cross-section and a 
longer time span (1992-2011 versus 2000-2010 in Büyükşahin and Robe, 2010 or 2005-2009 in 
Brunetti et al., 2011). We examine a range of trading strategies that hedge fund managers 
employ, rather than just aggregate net positions. Therefore, our findings are not only of relevance 
to the debate about whether speculators have an effect on commodity futures markets that 
disadvantages producers and consumers, we can also identify whether hedge funds damage the 
very property of commodity returns that made the asset class attractive investments in the first 
place – namely their low correlations with other asset classes.  
 
3. Data 
We obtain data on a sample of 27 commodity futures price series for the period 2 October 1992 
to 25 March 2011 from Thomson Datastream. These series are the following commodity futures: 
random length lumber, five metals, five energy futures, four livestock futures, and 12 agricultural 
futures. We employ a wider range of commodities than that typically used in the literature.
5
 Our 
choice of series, as well as their frequency (weekly) and sample period, is dictated by the 
existence of information in the CFTC Commitment of Traders report on the positions of 
speculators and hedgers. The positions of commercial traders (hedgers) and non-commercial 
traders (speculators) are collected every Tuesday and made available to the public the following 
Friday. To construct a continuous futures pricing series, we assume that to avoid physically 
delivering the commodity, the nearby contract is held until the last Friday of one month prior to 
maturity and then investors roll their positions to switch into the second nearest contract. The 
                                                          
4 Büyükşahin and Robe (2010) tests whether excess speculation (as measured by the T-index) has 
an impact on conditional correlation between the S&P500 and the S&P-GSCI. Our approach is 
more likely to detect an impact, if any, inasmuch as we test whether long-short speculators 
influence volatility and correlation with respect to their own commodity portfolios and not the 
market as a whole. 
5 Because of availability on CIT positions, Irwin et al. (2009), Irwin and Sanders (2011) and 
Sanders and Irwin (2011a, 2011b) focus on agriculture only. Büyükşahin and Robe (2010) cover 
17 commodities; Brunetti et al. (2011) focus on 3 commodities. 
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procedure is reiterated using the then second-nearest contract. Thus futures returns are always 
calculated using price changes on the same contract in a fashion that can be replicated by 
investors. The choice of nearest and second-nearest contracts (rather than employing all available 
contracts including the more distant ones) is to ensure that all are liquid.
6
 When the continuous 
pricing series is obtained, we compute continuously compounded (log) returns for use in all 
subsequent models and analysis.  
Summary statistics for the commodity futures returns are given in Table 1. It is evident that, 
confirming Erb and Harvey’s (2006) earlier observation, commodities did not perform well over 
the sample period when considered as individual investments, with both low average returns and 
high standard deviations. From 1992-2011, the average excess return across all commodity 
futures in our sample was almost exactly zero, but with a huge range around this figure. Ten 
commodities had negative average excess returns, while it was positive for the remaining 
seventeen. Electricity was by far the worst performer with average annualized excess returns of -
25.7%, while the best were copper, crude oil, palladium, platinum, silver, and soybean meal, all 
of which generated excess returns of 9-11% per annum.  
Panel B of the table shows that the commodity indices did not do better than the typical behavior 
of the individual components, with average returns close to zero for an equally-weighted long-
only portfolio and around 4% for the Standard and Poor’s Goldman Sachs Commodity Index 
(S&P-GSCI), which is a production-weighted index of the prices of exchange-traded, liquid, 
physical commodity futures contracts and is heavily weighted towards oil. 
The paper analyzes the evolution in the conditional correlations between long-short commodity 
portfolios and traditional assets. To represent the latter, we choose the S&P-500 Composite Index 
and Barclays Capital US Aggregate Bond Index. To measure the risk-adjusted performance of the 
portfolios, we examine their Sharpe ratios. The Sharpe ratio of the S&P-GSCI (0.2), despite 
                                                          
6
  There is a slight inconsistency in that our construction of the continuous futures price series 
employs only the nearest and second nearest to maturity contracts but the hedging pressure 
involves an average over all maturity contracts. However, the COT only reports the aggregate 
open interest over all contract expirations and there is no way to split this into the nearest versus 
other contracts. In keeping with almost the entire literature dealing with futures contracts, 
however, we prefer to employ the nearest and next nearest contracts which are highly liquid; 
more distant contracts, by contrast, are much more thinly traded. Further results demonstrate that 
this inconsistency should not be a significant issue in practice since in most cases the front 
contract represents a very large part of the overall open interest. 
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being considerably better than that of the equally-weighted portfolio (0.05), is below that of the 
S&P500 stock index (0.24) and well below that of an aggregate bond index (0.66). The Sharpe 
ratio of the S&P500 index also exceeds that of 22 (out of 27) individual commodities. 
<< Insert Table 1 around here >> 
To determine the liquidity of the commodity markets that we consider in this study, the two 
rightmost columns of Table 1 display the average open interest for each series. For most 
commodities in the sample, the markets appear to have sufficient depth, although this is not the 
case for electricity, pork bellies, random length lumber and rough rice. A lack of liquidity would 
have an impact upon the abilities of speculators to implement the strategies that we consider 
below. Therefore, in order to mitigate its effects, we specifically exclude the 25% of series with 
the lowest average open interest over the R weeks immediately prior to portfolio formation.
7
 
The CFTC classifies traders based on the sizes of their positions into those who are “reportable” 
and those who are “non-reportable.” Reportable traders constitute 70% to 90% of the open 
interest in any given futures markets and are further recorded as “commercial” or “non-
commercial.” Commercial traders use commodity derivatives to hedge price risk. Non-
commercial traders have no position in the underlying asset; they either take a long-only 
approach or speculate on an upcoming rise or fall in prices.
8
 Aside from declaring whether they 
are commercial (hedgers) or non-commercial (speculators), traders also have to report whether 
they are long or short. The evolution in the long and short positions of speculators (i.e., non-
commercial traders) is pictured in Figure 1, where the plot is for the open interest of both long 
and short speculators averaged across our 27 commodities (on the left-hand side) and for the 
futures prices of the S&P-GSCI (on the right-hand side). Two points are worth noting. First, the 
huge changes in the open interest of long speculators seem to parallel the dramatic ups and downs 
of the S&P-GSCI over the 1992-2011 period. This gives credibility to the claim that the activities 
                                                          
7
 The problem is magnified in our case since we adopt equally-weighted portfolios in order to 
ensure that the strategies are well-diversified and are not effectively focused on just one or two 
commodities.  
8
 We should note a potential issue, first identified by Ederington and Lee (2002), that trader 
designations may not be correct in some cases. In particular, as traders self-classify, there may be 
an incentive for speculators to specify that they are commercial hedgers and thus the latter 
category may include traders who should be in the former. Although there is no way of knowing 
how large this reporting bias is, it is unlikely to be huge as CFTC staff members routinely check 
declarations, reallocating traders to their rightful category if necessary. 
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of speculators could have increased the volatility of the S&P-GSCI. Second, both the long and 
short positions of speculators have risen sharply over the period 1992-2011, confirming that 
indeed there was an increase in the financialization of commodity futures markets.  
<< Insert Figure 1 around here >> 
We construct separate measures of hedging pressure for speculators and for hedgers, both based 
on the declarations of market participants summarized in the Commitment of Traders report. 
These measures are constructed by taking for the previous week the number of long positions as a 
proportion of the total number of long and short positions by non-commercial traders.
9
 So, for 
instance, a hedging pressure value of 0.3 for hedgers would imply that only 30% of hedgers were 
long over the immediately prior week and the remaining 70% were short and thus the market was 
backwardated.
10
 On the other hand, a value of 0.3 for speculators shows that 30% of speculators 
were long with the remaining 70% being short, indicative of a contangoed market.
11
 
The hedging pressure measures thus defined are used in two ways. First, as in Basu and Miffre 
(2013), we use them as signals for sorting commodity futures into portfolios, where the returns of 
portfolios that buy backwardated commodities and sell contangoed commodities are deemed to 
replicate the returns that speculators earned over the period 1992-2011 for taking on price risk. 
Second, we use the hedging pressure measures to test whether commodity markets have become 
more volatile - and asset markets more integrated - under the actions of speculators. The idea here 
is to test whether changes in the hedging pressure of speculators Granger-cause changes in the 
                                                          
9 Because hedging pressure is a ratio with open interest in both the numerator and denominator, 
the measure is invariant to changes in the specification of the individual contracts over time. 
Therefore, there is no need to adjust the COT data as in Bryant et al. (2006).  
10
 Backwardation occurs when commodity producers are more prone to hedge than commodity 
consumers and processors. The then net short positions of hedgers lead to the intervention of net 
long speculators and thus to the rising price pattern typically associated with backwardation. In 
our setting, backwardation translates into low hedging pressure for hedgers and high hedging 
pressure for speculators. 
11
Contango arises when consumers and processors of a commodity outnumber producers. The 
then net long positions of hedgers lead to the intervention of net short speculators and to the 
falling price pattern typically linked to contango. In our setting, contango translates into high 
hedging pressure for hedgers and low hedging pressure for speculators. 
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volatilities of the portfolios they hold or changes in the conditional return correlations between 
their portfolios and traditional assets. 
4. Methodology 
To mimic the trading behavior of long-short market participants, we implement a battery of long-
short strategies that hedge fund managers are known to follow (Bhardwaj et al., 2008), where 
these strategies are based on momentum and term structure signals. We also replicate their 
trading behavior by looking at the positions they took (Basu and Miffre, 2013). In total we have 
eight strategies that are based on performance, roll-returns, the positions of hedgers or/and the 
positions of speculators. These rule-based strategies aim at systematically taking long positions in 
the commodities whose prices are expected to appreciate and short positions in the commodities 
whose prices are expected to depreciate.
12
 Sections 4.1 and 4.2 briefly summarize the 
methodologies used to implement these strategies. Section 4.3 then presents the techniques 
employed to model the conditional volatility of commodity portfolios and their conditional return 
correlations with traditional assets. Finally, Section 4.4 introduces the methodology employed to 
test whether changes in speculators’ positions Granger-cause changes in volatility or changes in 
correlation. 
 
4.1. Momentum and Term Structure Strategies 
Further to the approaches documented in Erb and Harvey (2006) and Miffre and Rallis (2007), 
we construct momentum portfolios by taking long positions in the quintile of commodity futures 
having the highest average returns during the ranking period of R weeks (“the winners”) and 
short positions in the quintile of futures having the lowest returns over the same horizon (“the 
losers”). These positions are then retained for a holding period of H weeks and are then 
rebalanced and a new set of portfolios are formed following the same procedure.  
We construct term structure portfolios by taking long positions in the quintile of commodity 
futures having the best mean roll returns during the R-week ranking period and short positions in 
                                                          
12 We remind the reader that each of the strategies described below are implemented on all 
commodities but omitting the 25% that have the lowest average open interest at the portfolio 
formation point. We adopt this filter to ensure liquidity in the instruments such that all of the 
strategies could have been implemented in a timely fashion and with acceptable transactions 
costs. 
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the quintile of futures having the smallest mean roll returns over this horizon (see Erb and 
Harvey, 2006; Gorton and Rouwenhorst, 2006). We calculate the roll return as the nearby 
contract’s log price less that of the second nearest. These positions are again retained for a 
holding period of H weeks and are then rebalanced and new portfolios are formed following the 
same procedure. 
We also adopt a combined strategy that results from a two-way sort on the momentum and term 
structure measures, following Fuertes et al. (2010). To first sort by momentum, our full sample is 
initially separated using R-week average returns into Winner and Loser portfolios each containing 
50% of the available cross section. To then sort by term structure, we purchase the 40% of the 
Winner portfolio’s constituents that have the greatest mean R-week roll returns and we sell the 
40% of the Loser portfolio’s constituents that have the lowest R-week roll returns. These long 
and short positions are retained for the following H weeks. Since the implicit choice above to 
first sort on past return performance and then on roll returns was entirely arbitrary, we then repeat 
the two way sort procedure but now swapping the order of forming the portfolios. 
 
4.2. Hedging Pressure Strategies 
The next group of strategies we consider are based on hedging pressure and aim to replicate the 
reward that speculators would gain by assuming the price risk that hedgers want to offload – see 
Basu and Miffre (2013).We construct a portfolio that takes long positions in the quintile of most 
backwardated commodity futures for which hedgers had the lowest mean hedging pressure (i.e. 
where they were most net short) over an R-week portfolio formation period. We also construct a 
portfolio that takes short positions in the quintile of most contangoed commodity futures for 
which hedgers had the greatest mean hedging pressure (i.e. where they were most net long) over 
the same formation period. We then hold these long and short positions for the following H 
weeks before the portfolios are rebalanced and a new set of portfolios is formed.   
We also adopt long-short strategies based on the hedging pressure of speculators. We implement 
a long portfolio using the quintile of commodity futures for which speculators had the highest 
mean hedging pressure (i.e. they were most net long) over the R-week portfolio formation period. 
Similarly, we implement a short portfolio using the quintile of commodity futures for which 
speculators had the lowest mean hedging pressure (i.e. they were most net short) over the same 
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portfolio formation horizon. We then hold these long and short positions for the following H 
weeks before the portfolios are rebalanced and a new set of portfolios is formed.   
Following Basu and Miffre (2013), we further implement a combined strategy that results from a 
two-way sort on the positions of hedgers and speculators. The collection of all commodities is 
split into two equal samples based on the mean hedging pressure of hedgers over the previous R 
weeks. We thus form a backwardated portfolio (which we term ‘LowHedg’) and a contangoed 
portfolio (‘HighHedg’). Next, the positions of hedgers are combined with those of speculators by 
buying the 40% of LowHedg for which speculators had the highest hedging pressure and selling the 
40% of HighHedg for which speculators had the lowest hedging pressure over the R-week horizon. 
As previously, we then hold these long and short positions for the following H weeks before the 
portfolios are rebalanced and a new set of portfolios is formed.  The implicit choice that we made 
above was to first sort on the hedging pressure of hedgers and then on the hedging pressure of 
speculators. However, this ordering was entirely arbitrary, so we then repeat the two way sort 
procedure but  now swapping the order of forming the portfolios. 
The approaches that we design to capture the trading behavior of hedgers and speculators are 
identical in all respects except for the sorting method used to form the portfolios. The portfolio 
formation and holding periods, R and H respectively, are set throughout to 4, 13, 26 or 52 weeks. 
All possible combinations (4  4) of these four ranking and holding periods leads to a total of 16 
long-short portfolios for each of the strategies we described above. For simplicity of presentation, 
we report the results from a portfolio that equally-weights these 16 combinations of horizons 
throughout the rest of this paper.
13
 Also, taking our lead from existing research (see, for example, 
Erb and Harvey, 2006; Miffre and Rallis, 2007), to avoid the strategies being excessively 
concentrated in a small number of commodities and to ensure reasonable diversification, we also 
                                                          
13
 It would be of interest to report the results for a wider range of portfolios but unfortunately the 
number of possible such portfolios makes this infeasible (we have 16 strategies per signal, four 
signals used as stand alone, and four signals used in combination, making a total of over 100 
possible strategies). We do not have any reason to favour some of these strategies as being more 
sensible or useful than others and so selecting any individual ones would be entirely arbitrary. In 
addition, we wish to mimic the behaviour and impact aggregated across all speculators who may 
have different ranking and holding periods and taking an equally-weighted portfolio will 
approximately achieve this. 
  
12 
equally-weight the constituents of the long and short portfolios. Finally, the long-short portfolios 
are conservatively assumed to have a leverage of two – i.e. they are 50% collateralized.14 
 
4.3. Modeling Conditional Volatility and Conditional Correlation 
To model volatility, we use the generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity 
GARCH(1,1) model of Bollerslev (1986). The GARCH(1,1) variance, hC,t, describes the 
volatility dynamics of a (long, short or long-short) commodity portfolio C as follows 
1,
2
1,,
,,
 

tCtCtC
tCtC
hh
R


       (1) 
RC,t is the time t return of the (long, short or long-short) commodity portfolio modeled in Sections 
4.1. and 4.2., εC,t are residuals distributed as ),0( ,tChN , μ is the mean return of RC,t, α,  and γ are 
such that γ> 0, α ≥ 0, β ≥ 0 and α + β< 1.  
When it comes to modeling the return co-movements between commodities C and traditional 
assets T, we use the dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) model of Engle (2002).
15
 DCC time-
varying correlations are estimated in two steps. The first step estimates time-varying variances as 
GARCH(1,1) processes and the second step models a time-varying correlation matrix using the 
standardized residuals from the first-stage estimation. More specifically, the covariance matrix is 
expressed as tttt DRDH  , where  tTtCt hhdiagD ,, ,  is a diagonal matrix of univariate 
GARCH(1,1) volatilities and 1*1*  tttt QQQR  is the time varying correlation matrix, with: 
-  tTCt qQ ,, as described by     11,1,1   ttTtCt bQaQbaQ  , where tC , tCtC hR ,,  
and 
tTtTtT hR ,,,  are standardized residuals modeled from the first stage. Q  is the NN 
unconditional covariance matrix of standardized residuals, and a and b are non-negative 
coefficients satisfying a + b< 1, 
                                                          
14
 Hedge funds typically opt for considerably higher leverage multiples.  
15
 See Büyükşahin and Robe (2010), Büyükşahin et al. (2010), Chong and Miffre (2010) for an 
analysis of conditional correlations between traditional assets and long-only commodity futures. 
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-    tiitiit qqQ ,*,*   is a diagonal matrix composed of the square root of the ith diagonal 
elements of 
tQ , where i stands for C or T. 
Rewriting 1*1*  tttt QQQR , the time t conditional return correlation between a commodity and 
traditional asset can then be expressed as  
tTtC
tTC
tTC
qq
q
,,
,,
,,           (2) 
 
4.4. Testing for Granger-causality 
Our analysis focuses on the hedging pressure (HP) of speculators, which measures the propensity 
of speculators to be net long or net short. Essentially, a high HP (e.g., 0.8) translates into large 
speculators being net long (e.g., 80% are long and 20% are short), while a low HP (e.g., 0.2) 
translates into large speculators being net short (e.g., 20% are long and 80% are short). We 
measure the average hedging pressure of speculators in each week of the holding period for the 
commodities included in a given (long, short or long-short) commodity portfolio C. We denote 
this quantity  and use   as a measure of the propensity of speculators to change their 
commodity exposure. In the case of a long portfolio, a positive   means that long 
speculators increased their long exposure. In the case of a short portfolio, a negative   
means that short speculators decreased their long exposures and thus increased their short 
exposures. 
To test whether the increased financialization of commodity markets led to change in volatility, 
we run tests of the null hypothesis that changes in the hedging pressure of speculators do not 
Granger-cause changes in the volatility of the long, short and long-short commodity portfolio 
returns. Namely, the following regression is estimated: 
     (3) 
tCh , measures the change in the annualized conditional volatility of the long (respectively 
short, respectively long-short) commodity portfolio, represents the first lag in the change 
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of the average hedging pressure of speculators for the assets included in long (respectively short, 
respectively long-short) commodity portfolio C over the holding period, νC,t are disturbances and 
δ0, δ1 and δ2 are parameters to estimate. The null hypothesis that δ1 = 0 is then tested using a 
Granger-causality test, where a rejection of the null indicates that speculators through their long 
(respectively short, respectively long-short) positions had an impact on volatility. If δ1is positive 
and significant for a given long portfolio, then increases in the long positions of speculators 
(namely, ) destabilize commodity markets by increasing the volatility of that long 
portfolio returns. Similarly, if δ1 is negative and significant for a given short portfolio, then 
increases in the short positions of speculators (namely, ) destabilize commodity 
markets by increasing the volatility of the returns of that short portfolio. 
Granger-causality tests are also used to investigate whether the financialization of commodity 
markets had a bearing on conditional correlation. The following regression is estimated for the 
conditional return correlations between the long, short and long-short commodity portfolios C 
and the traditional asset class T 
    (4) 
We test three sets of null hypotheses. First, that changes in the hedging pressure of speculators 
for the constituents of the long portfolios in (4) do not Granger-cause a change in the conditional 
correlation between the returns of the long commodity portfolio and the returns of the traditional 
asset. Second, that changes in the hedging pressure of speculators for the constituents of the short 
portfolios in (4) do not Granger-cause a change in the conditional correlation between the returns 
of the short commodity portfolio and the returns of the traditional asset. Third, that changes in the 
hedging pressure of speculators for the constituents of the long-short portfolios in (4) do not 
Granger-cause a change in the conditional correlation between the returns of the long-short 
commodity portfolio and the returns of the traditional asset. As in equation (3), a positive and 
significant δ1 in (4) indicates increased integration driven by speculators increasing their long 
positions. A negative and significant δ1 in (4) indicates increased integration driven by 
speculators increasing their short positions.  
We employ two lag lengths in the tests – a lag of one week but we also (separately) test the joint 
significance of the lags up to order four in equations (3) and (4). Note that since we consider 
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changes in all of the variables rather than their levels in the Granger-causality tests, we can be 
confident that all of the variables employed are stationary.  
Finally, we test the robustness of the results to three different specifications of equations (3) and 
(4). Following Irwin and Sanders (2011), Brunetti et al. (2011) and Büyükşahin and Robe (2010), 
the first robustness test uses conditional volatility and conditional correlation as dependent and 
independent variables in (3) and (4) instead of their changes. As conditional volatilities and 
correlations do not depend solely on past values and traders’ positions, the second robustness test 
augments equations (3) and (4) with the first lag in two business cycle variables
16
 (in a way 
similar to Büyükşahin and Robe, 2010). Finally, the third robustness test uses the disaggregated 
(instead of aggregated) Commitment of Traders report to test the null hypothesis that professional 
money managers (i.e., CTAs, CPOs and hedge funds) had no destabilizing effect on conditional 
volatility and correlation.   
 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1. Performance of Long-Short Commodity Portfolios 
Table 2 presents a summary of the performances of all of the various trading strategies that we 
outlined above – including their mean excess returns, a t-test for the significance of those returns, 
their standard deviations, and Sharpe ratios. Results for the momentum and term structure 
strategies are given in Panel A, those based on hedging pressure are given in Panel B, and finally 
for comparison Panel C returns similar results for the equally-weighted and S&P-GSCI long-only 
portfolios. As stated above, in order to keep the number of results manageable, only the results 
for a portfolio that equally-weights all possible combinations of the four formation and holding 
periods are presented.  
In summary, Table 2 shows that active long-short strategies are able to significantly outperform a 
passive, long-only approach.
17
 The mean risk-adjusted performance of the active strategies as 
                                                          
16
 The business cycle variables considered are the default spread (difference in yields between 
BAA and AAA-rated bonds) and term spread (difference between 10-year constant maturity T-
bond yield and 3-month T-bill rate), where the data are downloaded from the Federal Reserve of 
St Louis. These are also measured weekly.  
17
 We proxy the performance of the average CTA by that of the EDHEC-Risk Institute Global 
CTA Index. Over the sample January 1997 - March 2011 for which we have CTA data, both our 
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measured by the Sharpe ratio is 0.46 for the momentum and term structure group and 0.55 for the 
hedging pressure group, yet it is a mere 0.05 for the equally-weighted passive portfolio and 0.20 
for the S&P commodity index. These findings serve to further confirm the previously reported 
need to take on board the degree of backwardation and contango when designing commodity 
futures trading strategies. 
<< Insert Table 2 around here >> 
Table 2 also presents slope coefficients from regressions of the hedging pressure of speculators 
on a time trend for each of the commodity strategies presented in Section 3, where hedging 
pressure is measured as , i.e., as the cross-sectional average of the hedging pressure of 
speculators for the constituents of the long-short portfolios over the holding period for the 
strategy. The idea is to investigate how the average hedging pressure of speculators for the 
commodity futures included in the long-short portfolios changes over time. An increased level of 
financialization of commodity markets would translate into an increase in the hedging pressure of 
speculators for the long-short portfolios over time. This would be consistent with the idea that 
speculators took more long-short positions at the end of the sample than they did at the 
beginning, a sign of increased financialization.  
The slope coefficients on the time trend reported in Table 2 are for the most part in line with this 
viewpoint. They are positive and significant at the 1% level for seven of eight long-short 
portfolios, confirming the evidence from the perspective of the long-short portfolios of an 
increased financialization of commodity markets. The question remains, however., as to whether 
this observed increase in the financialization of commodity futures markets by long-short 
investors led to an increase in the volatility of commodity markets and to an increase in their 
conditional correlations with traditional assets. We now turn our attention to these questions. 
 
5.2. Granger-causality Tests using the Aggregated Commitment of Traders Report 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
long-short commodity portfolios and the average CTA substantially outperform long-only 
benchmarks (the Sharpe ratio of our long-short portfolios equals 0.61 on average, that of the CTA 
Global benchmark is at 0.55 versus 0.15 for the S&P-GSCI and -0.02 for the equally-weighted 
portfolio of all commodities). Thus, as in Table 2 for our long-short portfolios, the average CTA 
outperforms long-only benchmarks. This comparison should, however, be treated with some 
caution as unlike the average CTA, we do not take positions in global equity, fixed income and 
FX markets. 
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Results from tests as to whether speculators increase volatility and cross-market linkages are 
reported in Table 3 for the long, short and long-short portfolios. We present estimates and their 
associated t-statistics (in parentheses) for δ1 in (3) and (4), and p-values for the null hypothesis 
that changes in the hedging pressure of speculators does not Granger-cause changes in either 
conditional volatility (Panel A) or conditional correlation (Panels B and C). As the data 
frequency is weekly, we report p-values from Granger-causality tests with four lags as well as 
one (under the headings p(4) and p(1) respectively).  
<< Insert Table 3 around here >> 
Regardless of the panel or portfolio, δ1 is never significant at the 5% level. This indicates that 
speculators neither increased nor decreased conditional volatility or conditional correlation. The 
p-values indicate a failure to reject the null hypothesis of no-causality for all the long portfolios, 
all but one of the short portfolios, and all the long-short portfolios. This shows that the increased 
participation of speculators did not increase either the volatility of the portfolios they held or the 
level of integration of these portfolios with traditional assets. These results go against the idea 
that speculators destabilized commodity markets or increased asset correlations by treating 
commodities as part of their strategic and tactical asset allocations.  
Two robustness checks are implemented. Following Brunetti et al. (2011) and Büyükşahin and 
Robe (2010), we test whether our results on the financialization of commodity markets are any 
different first if we use the level (instead of the change) in conditional volatility and in 
conditional correlation in (3) and (4); and second, if we include as explanatory variables the first 
lag in two business cycle variables (the default spread and term spread). The p-values from 
Granger-causality tests, reported on the right-hand side of Table 3 (under the headings Test 1 and 
Test 2), are all greater than 5% and thus the results are consistent with those previously reported.  
 
5.3. Granger-causality Tests using the Disaggregated Commitment of Traders Report 
The analysis conducted thus far focuses on the positions of commercial market participants 
(hedgers) and non-commercial market participants (speculators) as reported in the Commitment 
of Traders report. According to the CFTC website, the “commercial” category includes 1. 
Producers, processors, merchants and users of the underlying commodity (who use commodity 
derivatives to hedge price risk); and 2. Swap dealers (who hedge their short OTC positions by 
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taking long futures positions). The “non-commercial” category includes 1. Professional money 
managers (CTAs, CPOs and hedge funds); and 2. A wide array of other non-commercial traders 
not classified as professional money managers (e.g., pension funds with long-only positions). 
Strictly, swap dealers are not pure hedgers in the sense of Keynes (1930) since they do not have a 
position in the underlying commodity. Similarly, pension funds and long-only indexers are not 
pure Keynesian speculators since they merely seek passive exposure to commodity markets as 
part of their strategic asset allocation.  
Bearing these distinctions in mind, the disaggregated Commitment of Traders report (also 
available from the CFTC website) splits the positions of market participants explicitly into four 
categories: 1. Pure hedgers (producers, processors, merchants and users of the physical 
commodity); 2. Swap dealers; 3. Pure speculators (professional money managers such as CTAs, 
CPOs and hedge funds); and 4. Other non-commercial traders. It is hoped that by omitting other 
non-commercial traders from the non-commercial category, we will get a better idea of the trades 
implemented by pure speculators (professional money managers). Similarly, by omitting swap 
dealers from the commercial category, we will obtain a better picture of pure hedging demand 
from those who have a commercial interest in the physical commodity. Disaggregated data on the 
positions of pure hedgers and pure speculators are only available since June 13, 2006, which 
restricts the ensuing analysis to the period June 2006 – March 2011.  
Figure 2 plots the evolution in the S&P-GSCI (on the right-hand scale) and the evolution in the 
long and short open interests of professional money managers averaged across our 27 
commodities (on the left-hand scale). The long positions have risen sharply and seem to follow 
the ups and downs of the S&P-GSCI, legitimizing the concern that changes in the former could 
have increased volatility. On the other hand, the short positions look as if they remained constant, 
hovering around 25,000 over the period 2006-2011. As the short positions of professional money 
managers pretty much remained constant, their change is unlikely to have increased volatility.  
<< Insert Figure 2 around here>> 
Table 4 presents summary statistics for the performances of long-short and long-only commodity 
portfolios over the period June 2006 – March 2011. Unlike in Table 2, the asset allocation of the 
portfolios based on the positions of hedgers or/and speculators is based on the disaggregated 
hedging pressure of pure hedgers and pure speculators as opposed to the aggregated hedging 
pressure of commercial and non commercial traders. As in Table 2 however, the results of Table 
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4 highlight the importance of taking long, as well as short, positions in commodity futures 
markets. Over this shorter sample too, the Sharpe ratios of the long-short portfolios 
systematically and substantially exceed those of the long-only portfolios (which happen to be 
negative and as low as -0.15 in the case of the S&P-GSCI). The best performance is achieved 
within the double-sort portfolio based on the positions of, first, hedgers and, second, speculators, 
whose equally-weighted portfolio of 16 permutations of ranking and holding periods achieves a 
Sharpe ratio of 1.19. Table 4 also presents slope coefficients of regressions of the hedging 
pressure of pure speculators on a time trend for each of the long-short strategies, where the 
hedging pressure of pure speculators is measured as , namely, as the cross-sectional average 
of the HP of pure speculators for the constituents of the long-short portfolios over the holding 
period of the strategy. With only one exception, these slope coefficients are positive and 
significant at the 5% level, indicating (as in Table 2 for the longer sample) an increase in the 
financialization of commodity markets over this shorter period. 
<< Insert Table 4 around here >> 
Instead of using the aggregated speculators’ positions as in Table 3, the positions of pure 
speculators (i.e., hedge funds) as disclosed in the CFTC disaggregated Commitment of Traders 
report are tracked in the holding periods of the long-short strategies and the cross-sectional 
average of these hedging pressures are measured for the constituents of the long-short portfolios. 
The first lag in the change of these average hedging pressures is then used as a regressor in (3) 
and (4) to test whether changes in the positions of pure speculators Granger-cause a change in the 
conditional volatility of the long-short portfolios they hold or a change in the conditional 
correlation between their portfolios and traditional assets. Table 5 reports tests of these 
hypotheses for conditional volatilities in Panel A and for conditional correlations in Panels B and 
C. None of the δ1 coefficients in (3) and (4) are significant even at the 10% level. With only one 
exception, the p-values for the null hypothesis of no Granger-causality are more than 10%, 
representing an almost systematic failure to reject the null hypothesis of no Granger-causality. 
Altogether, these conclusions are robust to the definition of the non-commercial category: 
whether it focuses exclusively on professional money managers or not, we find very little to no 
evidence that speculators destabilized commodity markets by increasing the volatility of the 
portfolios they held or the integration of these portfolios with traditional assets.  
<< Insert Table 5 around here >> 
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6. Conclusions 
This paper mimics the trading behavior of long-short commodity market participants using a 
battery of strategies that they are known to follow and tests whether their trading activities have 
an impact on the volatility of the commodity portfolios they hold or on cross-market correlations. 
If the presence of long-short commodity speculators is detrimental to the functioning of 
commodity markets, their trading should Granger-cause a change in the volatility of their 
portfolios and/or a change in the conditional correlation between their commodity portfolios and 
traditional assets. This would be a source of concern not only to regulators but to CTAs managers 
themselves as they would then destroy the very diversification benefits that they sought in the 
first instance.  
Our results find no support for the hypothesis that speculators destabilized commodity prices by 
increasing volatility or co-movements with traditional assets. Interestingly, this conclusion holds 
irrespective of whether speculators are labeled as “non-commercial” in the CFTC Commitment 
of Traders report or as “professional money managers” (i.e., CTAs, CPOs and hedge funds) in 
the CFTC disaggregated Commitment of Traders report. Thus, long-short speculators can take 
comfort in knowing that their trades do not alter the risk and diversification properties of their 
portfolios. It also follows from the analysis presented here that there is no need for concern 
relating to the participation of professional money managers in commodity futures markets. If we 
are looking for the causes of changes in commodity price instability, it seems that we must look 
elsewhere – and in particular at the fundamental drivers of commodity prices related to global 
current and expected future growth rates. Instead, it is important to devote more resources to 
collecting and analyzing inventory data worldwide as this information might be crucial in 
supporting an understanding of the drivers of volatility in commodity markets which are well 
rooted in the forces of supply and demand.  
While the media and governments courting popular opinion have called for an increase in the 
regulation of commodity speculators, our research adds to an emerging consensus that 
speculators do not have a damaging impact on the functioning of commodity markets. There are 
also concerns that introducing such unnecessary regulation could in itself be damaging. Sanders 
and Irwin (2011b) argue that attempts to curb speculative activities could reduce market liquidity 
and depth, and could increase risk premia and hedging costs. It may also lead to the development 
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of “off-shore” trading in less regulated jurisdictions or push traders to cash markets where the 
impacts on the prices of commodities faced by end consumers would be more direct.   
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Table 1: Summary Statistics  
The table presents summary statistics for the excess returns of individual commodity futures (Panel A), 
long-only commodity indices (Panel B) and traditional assets (Panel C). When it comes to excess returns, 
Mean is the annualized mean excess returns, t(Mean) stands for the associated t-statistic in parentheses, 
SD is the annualized standard deviation of excess returns, Sharpe is the ratio of the annualized mean to the 
annualized SD. S&P-GSCI is the Standard and Poor’s Goldman Sachs Commodity Index, and the S&P-
500 composite is a broad stock index. The mean open interest is calculated as the average over time of the 
open interests on the front or second-nearest contracts. The sample period is October 1992 to March 2011. 
Data frequency is weekly. 
 
Mean t (Mean) SD Sharpe Mean SD
Panel A: Individual Commodity Futures
Cocoa 0.0158 (0.22) 0.3053 0.0519 29,233     22,647     
Coffee C 0.0101 (0.11) 0.3825 0.0264 33,633     28,018     
Copper grade # 1 0.0878 (1.39) 0.2712 0.3238 13,319     16,594     
Corn -0.0577 (-0.91) 0.2714 -0.2125 217,261   167,378   
Cotton # 2 -0.0137 (-0.22) 0.2705 -0.0508 33,191     35,958     
Crude oil (light sweet) 0.0918 (1.18) 0.3343 0.2746 161,460   91,763     
Electricity -0.2569 (-1.52) 0.4477 -0.5738 2,235       888           
Feeder cattle 0.0298 (0.88) 0.1447 0.2058 7,898       4,446       
Frozen concentrated orange juice -0.0621 (-0.84) 0.3191 -0.1946 12,823     6,479       
Gasoline (Blendstock RBOB) 0.0452 (0.27) 0.3847 0.1175 54,401     28,559     
Gold 0.0427 (1.13) 0.1631 0.2617 108,846   91,539     
Heating oil # 2 0.0744 (1.00) 0.3207 0.2321 43,491     18,784     
Lean hogs -0.0602 (-0.99) 0.2615 -0.2302 27,765     24,873     
Live cattle 0.0066 (0.19) 0.1517 0.0433 56,973     36,524     
Natural gas -0.1618 (-1.48) 0.4686 -0.3452 59,756     43,832     
Oats -0.0199 (-0.27) 0.3187 -0.0624 5,955       3,090       
Palladium 0.0986 (1.22) 0.3483 0.2830 7,007       6,140       
Platinum 0.0940 (1.88) 0.2149 0.4373 11,821     7,484       
Pork bellies 0.0279 (0.35) 0.3439 0.0812 2,555       1,956       
Random length lumber -0.1255 (-1.67) 0.3232 -0.3884 2,709       1,664       
Rough rice -0.0918 (-1.13) 0.2723 -0.3372 4,618       3,211       
Silver 0.0855 (1.27) 0.2894 0.2954 51,021     23,392     
Soybean meal 0.1087 (1.71) 0.2731 0.3979 38,963     21,858     
Soybean oil 0.0065 (0.12) 0.2367 0.0275 48,655     38,297     
Soybeans 0.0550 (0.98) 0.2407 0.2287 86,780     67,679     
Sugar # 11 0.0539 (0.74) 0.3151 0.1711 142,656   108,928   
Wheat -0.0789 (-1.19) 0.2850 -0.2767 81,120     67,494     
Average 0.0002 0.2948 0.0292
Panel B: Long-Only Commodity Indices
Equally-weighted long-only portfolio 0.0064 (0.23) 0.1208 0.0529 50,552     25,281     
S&P-GSCI 0.0428 (0.84) 0.2178 0.1965 12,587     9,738       
Panel C: Traditional Asset Classes
S&P-500 composite index 0.0421 (1.03) 0.1755 0.2401
Barclays Capital US aggregate bond index 0.0295 (2.85) 0.0444 0.6631
Open interestExcess Returns
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Table 2: The Performance of Long-Short and Long-Only Commodity Portfolios 
The table presents summary statistics for long-short and long-only commodity portfolios. Strategies 
based on momentum and/or term structure signals are presented in Panel A; strategies based on 
hedging pressure in Panel B where the signals are modeled over four ranking periods, R, of 4, 13, 26 
and 52 weeks. The long-short portfolios are then held over four holding periods, H, of 4, 13, 26 and 52 
weeks. Instead of reporting summary statistics for each of the 16 portfolios that results from 
combinations of these R and H, a portfolio that equally-weights all 16 combinations is formed for each 
strategy. The table presents summary statistics for the excess returns of these equally-weighted 
portfolios. The Mean has been annualized, SD is the annualized standard deviation of the portfolio 
excess returns, Sharpe is the ratio of Mean to SD, Trend (×100) is 100 × the slope coefficient of a 
regression of the portfolio hedging pressure on a time trend. t(.) in parentheses stands for the 
associated t-statistic. EW represents an equally-weighted portfolio that includes all 27 commodities. 
The sample period is October 1992 to March 2011.  
 
Mean t (Mean) SD
Sharpe 
ratio
Trend 
(×100) t (Trend)
Panel A: Long-Short Portfolios Based on Momentum and/or Term Structure
Momentum 0.0416 (1.17) 0.1536 0.2711 -0.0001 (-0.09)
Term structure 0.0803 (2.02) 0.1712 0.4693 0.0170 (14.87)
Momentum-TS 0.0843 (2.39) 0.1518 0.5556 0.0094 (9.87)
TS-Momentum 0.0898 (2.44) 0.1584 0.5666 0.0079 (7.72)
Average 0.0740 0.1588 0.4656
Panel B: Long-Short Portfolios Based on Hedging Pressure
Hedgers 0.1140 (2.71) 0.1809 0.6302 0.0134 (11.13)
Speculators 0.0835 (2.09) 0.1717 0.4863 0.0141 (12.54)
Hedgers-Speculators 0.0784 (2.05) 0.1647 0.4759 0.0130 (11.44)
Speculators-Hedgers 0.1086 (2.66) 0.1753 0.6197 0.0141 (11.99)
Average 0.0961 0.1731 0.5530
Panel C: Long-Only Portfolios
EW 0.0064 (0.23) 0.1208 0.0529
S&P-GSCI 0.0428 (0.84) 0.2178 0.1965  
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Table 3: Granger-causality Tests 
The table tests whether changes in the positions of speculators Granger-cause changes in the volatility of commodity portfolios (Panel A) or changes in the 
conditional correlation between commodities and traditional asset returns (Panels B and C). δ1 is the slope coefficient of a regression of the change in these 
conditional volatilities (correlations) on the first lag of the change in the hedging pressure of speculators for the constituents of that specific commodity 
portfolio. t-statistics are in parentheses. p(n) is the p-value associated with test of the hypothesis that change in the positions of speculators do not Granger-cause 
change in volatility (correlation), n is the number of lags. The last two columns present p-values from two Granger-causality tests with four lags as robustness 
tests; the first test uses the levels of, instead of the changes in, conditional volatility and conditional correlation as dependent and independent variables in (3) 
and (4). The second test augments (3) and (4) with the first lag of default spread and term spread. The sample period is October 1992 to March 2011.  
 
p (1) p (4) p (1) p (4) p (1) p (4)
Panel A: Conditional volatility 
Momentum 0.0036 (0.21) 0.83 0.58 -0.0087 (-0.78) 0.44 0.90 0.0074 (1.55) 0.12 0.43 0.54 0.43
Term structure (TS) -0.0132 (-0.78) 0.43 0.94 -0.0054 (-0.72) 0.47 0.43 0.0005 (0.07) 0.95 0.82 0.87 0.78
Momentum-TS -0.0066 (-0.62) 0.54 0.62 0.0036 (0.58) 0.56 0.76 -0.0004 (-0.04) 0.97 0.97 0.87 0.79
TS-Momentum -0.0097 (-0.65) 0.52 0.68 0.0033 (0.39) 0.70 0.65 -0.0030 (-0.40) 0.69 0.80 0.65 0.47
Hedgers -0.0125 (-0.77) 0.44 0.71 -0.0077 (-0.99) 0.32 0.79 0.0079 (0.93) 0.35 0.79 0.98 0.97
Speculators 0.0055 (0.35) 0.72 0.81 -0.0003 (-0.03) 0.98 1.00 0.0115 (1.25) 0.21 0.46 0.79 0.79
Hedgers-Speculators -0.0074 (-0.59) 0.55 0.60 0.0059 (0.70) 0.48 0.84 -0.0014 (-0.19) 0.85 0.99 0.98 0.99
Speculators-Hedgers -0.0117 (-0.87) 0.39 0.64 0.0071 (1.16) 0.25 0.66 -0.0032 (-0.50) 0.61 0.93 0.94 0.94
Panel B: Conditional correlation with S&P500 index
Momentum -0.0270 (-0.64) 0.52 0.52 0.0071 (0.40) 0.69 0.04 -0.0188 (-0.79) 0.43 0.59 0.60 0.59
TS -0.0043 (-0.19) 0.85 0.06 0.0248 (0.80) 0.43 0.88 0.0183 (1.68) 0.09 0.09 0.16 0.09
Momentum-TS 0.0437 (1.25) 0.21 0.60 0.0290 (1.17) 0.24 0.51 -0.0137 (-0.63) 0.53 0.32 0.60 0.59
TS-Momentum 0.0180 (0.57) 0.57 0.81 0.0059 (0.21) 0.83 0.23 0.0063 (1.07) 0.28 0.70 0.46 0.46
Hedgers -0.0144 (-0.32) 0.75 0.06 0.0352 (1.41) 0.16 0.09 0.0053 (0.26) 0.80 0.59 0.31 0.32
Speculators -0.0187 (-0.42) 0.67 0.26 0.0195 (0.85) 0.40 0.08 0.0014 (0.05) 0.96 0.46 0.75 0.70
Hedgers-Speculators 0.0331 (0.96) 0.34 0.58 0.0118 (0.43) 0.67 0.42 0.0135 (1.58) 0.11 0.42 0.44 0.42
Speculators-Hedgers 0.0688 (1.62) 0.11 0.49 0.0149 (0.60) 0.55 0.12 -0.0001 (-0.01) 0.99 0.78 0.82 0.78
Panel C: Conditional correlation with Barclays bond index
Momentum 0.0033 (0.26) 0.79 0.26 -0.0043 (-0.45) 0.65 0.89 -0.0034 (-0.37) 0.71 0.95 0.86 0.95
TS -0.0094 (-0.20) 0.84 0.61 -0.0034 (-0.35) 0.72 0.92 0.0162 (0.44) 0.66 0.95 1.00 0.94
Momentum-TS 0.0116 (0.60) 0.55 0.89 0.0055 (0.70) 0.48 0.84 -0.0034 (-0.74) 0.46 0.71 0.87 0.87
TS-Momentum 0.0040 (0.20) 0.85 0.99 0.0071 (0.62) 0.54 0.97 -0.0361 (-0.76) 0.45 0.83 0.61 0.74
Hedgers -0.0077 (-0.18) 0.86 0.86 -0.0001 (-0.02) 0.98 0.93 0.0046 (0.21) 0.83 0.87 0.68 0.72
Speculators -0.0055 (-0.24) 0.81 0.76 -0.0033 (-0.75) 0.45 0.84 -0.0060 (-0.53) 0.60 0.74 0.93 0.83
Hedgers-Speculators 0.0040 (0.18) 0.86 0.87 0.0060 (0.23) 0.82 0.94 -0.0070 (-0.96) 0.33 0.55 0.67 0.55
Speculators-Hedgers 0.0212 (0.82) 0.41 0.80 0.0042 (0.57) 0.57 0.97 -0.0023 (-0.39) 0.69 0.54 0.41 0.56
Long portfolios
Test 1 Test 2
δ 1 δ 1 δ 1
Long-short portfoliosShort portfolios
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Table 4: Performance of Long-Short Commodity Portfolios: Evidence from the 
Disaggregated Commitment of Traders Report 
The positions of pure hedgers (i.e., producers, processors, merchants and users of the underlying 
commodity) and of pure speculators (i.e., CTAs, CPOs, and hedge funds) as disclosed in the CFTC 
disaggregated Commitment of Traders report are used to model the performance of the hedgers and 
speculators-based portfolios. The table presents summary statistics for long-short and long-only 
commodity portfolios over the period for which the disaggregated Commitment of Traders report 
data are available: July, 14 2006 – March, 25 2011. Strategies are based on momentum and/or term 
structure in Panel A and on hedging pressure in Panel B, where the signals are modeled over 
ranking periods, R, of 4, 13, 26 and 52 weeks. The long-short portfolios are then held over four 
holding periods, H, of 4, 13, 26 and 52 weeks. Instead of reporting summary statistics for each of 
the 16 portfolios that results from combinations of these R and H, a portfolio that equally-weights 
all 16 combinations is formed for each strategy. The table presents summary statistics for the 
excess returns of these equally-weighted portfolios. The Mean has been annualized, SD is the 
annualized standard deviation of the portfolio excess returns, Sharpe is the ratio of Mean to SD, 
Trend (×100) is 100 × the slope coefficient of a regression of the portfolio hedging pressure on a 
time trend. t(.) in parentheses stands for the associated t-statistic. EW represents an equally-
weighted portfolio that includes all 27 commodities.  
Mean t- stat SD
Sharpe 
ratio
Trend 
(×100) t (Trend)
Panel A: Long-Short Momentum and/or Term Structure Portfolios
Momentum 0.0529 (0.69) 0.1659 0.3190 0.0281 (5.00)
Term structure (TS) 0.0488 (0.56) 0.1908 0.2556 0.0912 (16.02)
Momentum-TS 0.0910 (1.19) 0.1660 0.5483 0.0598 (10.72)
TS-Momentum 0.0931 (1.19) 0.1707 0.5457 0.0558 (8.96)
Average 0.0715 0.1734 0.4171
Panel B: Long-Short Hedging Pressure Portfolios
Hedgers 0.1129 (1.11) 0.2212 0.5104 0.0186 (2.25)
Speculators 0.1856 (2.23) 0.1813 1.0235 0.0229 (2.78)
Hedgers-Speculators 0.2210 (2.59) 0.1857 1.1903 -0.0065 (-1.00)
Speculators-Hedgers 0.2131 (2.45) 0.1888 1.1285 0.0122 (2.32)
Average 0.1832 0.1943 0.9632
Panel C: Long-Only Portfolios
EW -0.0050 (-0.06) 0.1781 -0.0282
S&P-GSCI -0.0427 (-0.33) 0.2841 -0.1502  
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Table 5: Granger-causality Tests: Evidence from the Disaggregated Commitment of 
Traders Report 
The positions of pure hedgers (i.e., producers, processors, merchants and users of the underlying 
commodity) and of pure speculators (i.e., CTAs, CPOs, and hedge funds) as disclosed in the CFTC 
disaggregated Commitment of Traders report are used to model the performance of the hedger- and 
speculator-based portfolios and subsequently to test for Granger-causality between changes in 
conditional volatility (correlation) and changes in the positions of pure speculators. δ1 is the slope 
coefficient of regressions of the change in conditional volatility (correlation) on the first lag of the 
change in the hedging pressure of the pure speculators for the constituents of that specific 
commodity portfolio.  p(n)is the associated p-value when n lags are considered in the Granger-
causality tests. The sample covers the period: July, 14 2006 – March, 25 2011, for which data from 
the disaggregated Commitment of Traders report are available. 
p (1) p (4)
Panel A: Conditional Volatility of Commodity Portfolios
Momentum -0.0344 (-1.59) 0.11 0.26
Term structure (TS) -0.0011 (-0.03) 0.98 0.19
Momentum-TS 0.0117 (0.53) 0.60 0.74
TS-Momentum -0.0056 (-0.16) 0.87 1.00
Hedgers 0.0032 (0.20) 0.84 0.42
Speculators 0.0057 (0.28) 0.78 0.30
Hedgers-Speculators -0.0269 (-0.24) 0.81 0.45
Speculators-Hedgers -0.0040 (-0.25) 0.80 0.01
Panel B: Conditional Correlation with the S&P-500 Index
Momentum -0.1508 (-1.15) 0.25 0.79
TS 0.0941 (1.17) 0.24 0.81
Momentum-TS -0.0176 (-0.20) 0.84 0.85
TS-Momentum -0.0445 (-0.42) 0.68 0.99
Hedgers -0.0435 (-0.31) 0.75 0.50
Speculators -0.0759 (-0.89) 0.37 0.65
Hedgers-Speculators -0.1560 (-1.28) 0.20 0.41
Speculators-Hedgers -0.1240 (-1.15) 0.25 0.73
Panel C: Conditional Correlation with Barclays Aggregate Bond Index
Momentum 0.0025 (0.94) 0.35 0.64
TS -0.1823 (-1.06) 0.29 0.69
Momentum-TS 0.0739 (0.70) 0.48 0.91
TS-Momentum 0.0052 (0.34) 0.74 0.99
Hedgers 0.0111 (0.56) 0.58 0.88
Speculators 0.0002 (0.57) 0.57 0.89
Hedgers-Speculators -0.1212 (-0.60) 0.55 0.30
Speculators-Hedgers -0.1223 (-0.77) 0.44 0.73
δ 1
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Figure 1: Open Interest of Non-Commercial Traders 
The figure presents the evolution of the average open interests of traders who are self-classified as non-
commercial (i.e. speculators) over the sample period October 1992 to March 2011 (left-hand scale). The 
series is computed by taking the cross-sectional average of the long (short) open interests of 27 
commodities. For comparison, we also plot the value of the S&P-GSCI (right-hand scale) over the same 
sample period. 
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Figure 2: Open Interest of Professional Money Managers 
The figure presents the evolution of the average open interests of traders who are self-classified as 
professional money managers (CTAs, CPOs and hedge funds) over the sample period July 2006 – March 
2011 (left-hand scale). The series is computed by taking the cross-sectional average of the long (short) 
open interests of 27 commodities. For comparison, we also plot the value of the S&P-GSCI (right-hand 
scale) over the same sample period. 
 
